利誘管理法

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Joke: A poor Jew lived in the shtetl in 19th century Russia. A Cossack comes up to him on horseback.

笑話一則:一位窮苦的猶太人住在19世紀俄國的猶太村莊裡,這天,一位騎著馬的哥薩克騎兵來到他的身邊。

“What are you feeding that chicken?” asks the Cossack.

騎兵問道:「你拿什麼東西給那隻小雞吃?」

“Just some bread crumbs,” replies the Jew.

這猶太人答道:「只是一些麵包屑而已。」

“How dare you feed a fine Russian chicken such lowly food!” says the Cossack, and hits the Jew with a stick.

騎兵憤怒的叫道:「你竟然敢餵帶有優良血統的俄羅斯小雞吃如此低等的食物?」接著給這猶太人吃了紮實的一棍。

The next day the Cossack comes back. “Now what are you feeding that chicken?” ask the Jew.

隔日,這位騎兵回來再次問道:「現在你都拿什麼餵小雞?」

“Well, I give him three courses. There's freshly cut grass, fine sturgeon caviar, and a small bowl of heavy cream sprinkled with imported French chocolate truffles for dessert.”

「是這樣的,我給他三道菜:有新鮮的現割牧草、高等魚子醬和一小碗混合著重奶油與法國巧克力塊糖的飯後點心。」

“Idiot!” says the Cossack, beating the Jew with a stick. “How dare you waste good food on a lowly chicken!”

「大白癡!」這騎兵叫道。「你這麼好膽,竟然浪費如此高級的食物給低等的小雞!」然後又痛扁了這猶太人一頓。

On the third day, the Cossack again asks, “What are you feeding that chicken?”

第三天,騎兵再次問道:「你現在餵小雞吃什麼?」

“Nothing!” pleads the Jew. “I give him a kopeck and he buys whatever he wants.”

「沒餵!」猶太人恭敬答道。「我給他一戈比(譯註:前蘇聯的貨幣單位),讓牠自己買喜歡的東西吃。」

(pause for laughter)

(期待著笑聲)

(no?)

(沒有?)

(ba dum dum)

(巴啦啦)

(still no laughter)

(還是沒笑聲)

(oh well).

(好吧)

09candy.JPG

I use the term “Econ 101” a little bit tongue-in-cheek. For my non-American readers: most US college departments have a course numbered “101” which is the basic introductory course for any field. Econ 101 management is the style used by people who know just enough economic theory to be dangerous.

我使用這詞彙:Econ 101是有點不正經。這裡要先對非美國的讀者澄清一下:對大部分的美國大學學院的課程來說,若其帶有課程碼101,則代表它是該領域的基礎入門課程。因此Econ 101 management(後文皆稱為「利誘管理法」)用來指稱那些對於經濟學了解程度不足,其誤解卻恰足以造成傷害的管理方法。

The Econ 101 manager assumes that everyone is motivated by money, and that the best way to get people to do what you want them to do is to give them financial rewards and punishments to create incentives.

利誘管理法假定每個人都會被金錢所驅使,所以如果要讓人們去做你想要他們做的事情,最好的辦法就是以金錢上的報酬和懲罰來創造強烈的動機。

For example, AOL might pay their call-center people for every customer they persuade not to cancel their subscription.

舉例來說,美國線上可以加發獎金給他們的客服人員,假若他們能挽回欲退訂的客戶。

A software company might give bonuses to programmers who create the fewest bugs.

一個軟體公司可以加發獎勵給寫出最少臭蟲的程式員。

It works about as well as giving your chickens money to buy their own food.

這方法就如同拿錢給你的小雞,要他們自己去買想要的食物。(譯註:都是推卸自己應負的責任。)

One big problem is that it replaces intrinsic motivation with extrinsic motivation.

一個大的問題是:這方法會導致內在動機被外在動機取代掉。

Intrinsic motivation is your own, natural desire to do things well. People usually start out with a lot of intrinsic motivation. They want to do a good job. They want to help people understand that it's in their best interest to keep paying AOL $24 a month. They want to write less-buggy code.

內在動機是你自己擁有的,是一種想把事情做到盡善盡美的天性。人們一開始總是由許多的內在動機所驅使,他們想要做好分內工作:他們由衷地想要協助其他人了解支付美國線上一個月24美金能帶來無窮的樂趣、他們想要寫出較少錯誤的程式碼。

Extrinsic motivation is a motivation that comes from outside, like when you're paid to achieve something specific.

外在動機是來自於身外,就像是當你被雇用來做某些特殊的事。

Intrinsic motivation is much stronger than extrinsic motivation. People work much harder at things that they actually want to do. That's not very controversial.

內在動機比起外在動機強大多了,人們會投注心力於他們真正想做的事情上。這是無可置疑的。

But when you offer people money to do things that they wanted to do, anyway, they suffer from something called the Overjustification Effect. “I must be writing bug-free code because I like the money I get for it,” they think, and the extrinsic motivation displaces the intrinsic motivation. Since extrinsic motivation is a much weaker effect, the net result is that you've actually reduced their desire to do a good job. When you stop paying the bonus, or when they decide they don't care that much about the money, they no longer think that they care about bug free code.

但當你付錢請人們做他們原本內心期望要去做的事,他們將陷於「過度酬賞效應」的困境內,他們會認為:「我必須要寫出無臭蟲的程式,是因為我喜歡這麼做之後所得到的金錢」,接著外在動機便取代了內在動機。由於外在動機相較之下效用相當的弱,最終的結果就是你完全地降低他們對於做好一件工作的意念。當你停發紅利,或者他們決定不再在意金錢的多寡時,他們也就不再認為他們還需要關心程式的品質。

Another big problem with Econ 101 management is the tendency for people to find local maxima. They'll find some way to optimize for the specific thing you're paying them, without actually achieving the thing you really want.

另外一個關於利誘管理法大問題則是:人們將會傾向去尋找局部的最大獲益,他們會找到一些方法,去尋求最佳化某些你正獎勵他們的特殊事情,而不是完成你真正意圖要達成的事。

So for example your customer retention specialist, in his desire to earn the bonus associated with maintaining a customer, will drive the customer so crazy that the New York Times will run a big front page story about how nasty your customer “service” is. Although his behavior maximizes the thing you're paying him for (customer retention) it doesn't maximize the thing you really care about (profit). And then you try to reward him for the company profit, say, by giving him 13 shares of stock, and you realize that it's not really something he controls, so it's a waste of time.

舉例來說,當你的顧客挽留專家經營一位客戶關係時,內心只想著如何賺到紅利獎金,這樣只會把客戶惹毛(譯註:惹火了客戶,你的客戶挽留專家才會有工作做阿... XD),然後以斗大的標題登上紐約時代雜誌封面故事,敘說貴公司客服服務是如何讓人反感。雖然他的行為可在你要他做的這件事上(挽留客戶)表現最佳,但這麼做並不能讓你在最關心的事情(利潤)上,獲得最佳結果。之後當你為了公司利潤而試著去獎賞他時(例如給他13份的股票),才會恍然大悟這並非他所控制的事情,一切不過是浪費時間。

When you use Econ 101 management, you're encouraging developers to game the system.

當你使用利誘管理法時,你等於在鼓勵開發者玩弄制度。

Suppose you decide to pay a bonus to the developer with the fewest bugs. Now every time a tester tries to report a bug, it becomes a big argument, and usually the developer convinces the tester that it's not really a bug. Or the tester agrees to report the bug “informally” to the developer before writing it up in the bug tracking system. And now nobody uses the bug tracking system. The bug count goes way down, but the number of bugs stays the same.

假定你決定獎賞寫出最少臭蟲的開發者,那麼當測試人員要回報一個臭蟲時,就成了大問題了,開發著通常會說服測試員這並不是真的臭蟲;或者測試員會同意,在回報給臭蟲管理系統之前,先非正式地提報臭蟲給開發人員,那麼現在就沒有人會使用臭蟲管理系統啦,雖然記錄中的臭蟲數量降低,但實際的數量並沒有任何改變。

Developers are clever this way. Whatever you try to measure, they'll find a way to maximize, and you'll never quite get what you want.

開發者在這方面可是相當有天分的,無論你想要測量什麼,他們總是可以找到方法最大化此數值,而你永遠也無法獲得真正想要的東西。

Robert Austin, in his book Measuring and Managing Performance in Organizations, says there are two phases when you introduce new performance metrics. At first, you actually get what you wanted, because nobody has figured out how to cheat. In the second phase, you actually get something worse, as everyone figures out the trick to maximizing the thing that you're measuring, even at the cost of ruining the company.

Robert Austin在他的「組織效能量測與管理」一書中,提到當你引入新的效能度量機制後,會有兩個階段演變:一開始,由於沒有人知道怎麼作弊,所以你會獲得欲度量之物的真實數據;接著,當每個人都知道可最大化欲度量之數據的漏洞後,事情會開始惡化,代價甚至會高到毀了整間公司。

Worse, Econ 101 managers think that they can somehow avoid this situation just by tweaking the metrics. Dr. Austin's conclusion is that you just can't. It never works. No matter how much you try to adjust the metrics to reflect what you think you want, it always backfires.

更糟的是,使用「利誘管理法」的經理認為他們可以微調度量標的來避免這種狀況。但Austin博士的結論是你無法做到,這方法從未奏效,無論你如何地調整度量矩陣來反應你認為你想要的,最終終會失敗。

The biggest problem with Econ 101 management, though, is that it's not management at all: it's really more of an abdication of management. A deliberate refusal to figure out how things can be made better. It's a sign that management simply doesn't know how to teach people to do better work, so they force everybody in the system to come up with their own way of doing it.

「利誘管理法」最大的問題在於--沒錯,它其實不是管理,他僅比完全放棄管理還好上一些而已,是一種蓄意放棄去找讓事情變得更好的態度>這是一種警訊:管理者不知道如何去教導人們將工作做的更好,所以他們強迫大家跟隨他們自己的方法。

Instead of training developers on techniques of writing reliable code, you just absolve yourself of responsibility by paying them if they do. Now every developer has to figure it out on their own.

你逃避了自己應負的責任,僅僅用金錢來引誘他們,而不是教導開發人員撰寫可靠程式碼的技術。現在每位開發者他們只能各自努力了。

For more mundane tasks, working the counter at Starbucks or answering phone calls at AOL, it's pretty unlikely that the average worker will figure out a better way of doing things on their own. You can go into any coffee shop in the country and order a short soy caramel latte extra-hot, and you'll find that you have to keep repeating your order again and again: once to the coffee maker, again to the coffee maker when they forgot what you said, and finally to the cashier so they can figure out what to charge you. That's the result of nobody telling the workers a better way. Nobody figures it out, except Starbucks, where the standard training involves a complete system of naming, writing things on cups, and calling out orders which insures that customers only have to specify their drink orders once. The system, invented by Starbucks HQ, works great, but workers at the other chains never, ever come up with it on their own.

09charbucks.JPG

對於第一線的服務工作來說,像是在星巴克的櫃臺或美國線上的客服專線工作,不太能像一般的工作者一樣,能找出較好的工作方式來完成工作。你可以走進任何一家城市裡的咖啡店點一杯小杯熱豆漿焦糖拿鐵,然後你會發現你必須不斷複誦所點的餐點,咖啡師傅一遍、如果咖啡師傅忘了就得再複述一遍,最後是收銀員好讓他們可以知道該怎麼收費。這都根源自沒有人告訴這些員工更好的工作方式,直到星巴克...,現在他們的標準訓練包含了一整套系統,從命名、在杯子上記下事情、還有大聲複誦訂單以保證客人只需要點他們的飲料一次即可。這套運作良好的系統是由星巴克總部開發,個別的子系統的工作者,是沒有機會靠自己想出這樣的方式。

(譯註:個人並不認為對於一個企業來說,除了總部之外,就沒有人有能力從全局的觀點來改善作業方式,以沃爾瑪來說,他們的改善計畫很多都來自於各個分店,這是因為各分店上至店長下至員工都致力於找出問題、或實驗各種不同作法,以提升顧客滿意度。至於作者舉的點飲料例子,只能說以前咖啡店的店員可能無心於了解客戶的困擾所在,也不會重視客戶的滿意度。)

Your customer service people spend most of the day talking to customers. They don't have the time, the inclination, or the training to figure out better ways to do things. Nobody in the customer retention crew is going to be able to keep statistics and measure which customer retention techniques work best while pissing off the fewest bloggers. They just don't care enough, they're not smart enough, they don't have enough information, and they are too busy with their real job.

你的客服人員幾乎花費一整天的時間跟顧客對談,他們沒有時間、興趣或訓練去找出更好的方式以完成工作。在客戶挽留團隊中,則沒有人對於不滿意人數最少的部落客、願意留存統計數據,且評量哪種客戶挽留技術最佳。他們漠不關心、不夠敏慧、手中沒有足夠資訊、而且身陷於日常正規的工作中。

As a manager it's your job to figure out a system. That's Why You Get The Big Bucks.

身為管理者,找出並建造這樣的系統是你的責任,這也是你領那麼多薪水的原因。

If you read a little bit too much Ayn Rand as a kid, or if you took one semester of Economics, before they explained that utility is not measured in dollars, you may think that setting up simplified bonus schemes and Pay For Performance is a pretty neat way to manage. But it doesn't work. Start doing your job managing and stop feeding your chickens kopecks.

假若你幼時讀了太多Ayn Rand(譯註:她的哲學和小說裡強調個人主義的概念、理性的利己主義、以及徹底自由放任的資本主義,請參閱維基百科)的書,或者修習一個學期的經濟學(老師還沒解釋無法用金錢量測效用),你也許會認為設立簡單的紅利計畫,用錢來換效率是通往管理最簡單的路。可惜這是行不通的。開始做你的管理工作,並停止用戈比餵你的小雞們吧。

“Joel!” you yell. “Yesterday you told us that the developers should make all the decisions. Today you're telling us that the managers should make all the decisions. What's up with that?”

「約耳!」你叫道,「昨天你告訴我們應該允許開發者去做所有的決定,今日你又告訴我們管理者應該做所有的決定,這到底是怎麼回事?」

Mmm, not exactly. Yesterday I told you that your developers, the leaves in the tree, have the most information; micromanagement or Command and Control barking out orders is likely to cause non-optimal results. Today I'm telling you that when you're creating a system, you can't abdicate your responsibility to train your people by bribing them. Management, in general, needs to set up the system so that people can get things done, it needs to avoid displacing intrinsic motivation with extrinsic motivation, and it won't get very far using fear and barking out specific orders.

恩,並不是這樣,昨日我告訴你,你的開發人員擁有最多的資訊,微管理或以軍事化管理法下達你的命令僅會造成非最佳化的結果。今日我要告訴你的是當你建造一套系統時,你不能放棄你的責任,僅僅賄賂你的手下而不是訓練他們。一般來說,管理需要的是建立一套完整的系統好讓人們能做好工作,要極力避免以外在動機取代內在動機,且不需要使用恐懼或大吼大叫來下達指令。

Now that I've shot down Command and Control management and Econ 101 management, there's one more method managers can use to get people moving in the right direction. I call it the Identity method and I'll talk about it more tomorrow.

到目前為止,我已經說明了軍事化管理法和利誘管理法,接著還有一種管理法可以用來引領人們朝正確的方向移動,我稱之為認同法,明日將會做更詳細說明。

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